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Abstract 
The introduction of the personal income tax has often coincided with phases of democratization in 
history. A common explanation is that the demands of the newly enfranchised poor contribute to the 
rise of progressive taxes. Yet, although the world has, on average, become more democratic since the 
first permanent introduction of the income tax in Great Britain in 1842, inequality is again on the rise. 
To what extent do democratic societies really adopt more redistributive policies than their autocratic 
counterparts? In this paper, we shed light on the link between regime type and redistribution based on 
a new historical and global dataset of first permanent tax legislations. We compare the introduction of 
two direct progressive taxes, namely the inheritance tax and the personal income tax, with the 
introduction of two indirect taxes, the general sales and the value added tax. Whereas regime type has 
no influence on tax introduction in general, democracies are more likely to adopt progressive taxation. 
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1. Introduction: Regime Type, Size of Government, and Redistribution 
Taxation is one of the core functions of the nation state. Next to being the biggest source of 
government revenue, taxes are also powerful policy instruments for income redistribution - 
particularly progressive taxes such as the personal income and the inheritance tax. But under what 
conditions do governments implement new and redistributive forms of taxation? A common 
proposition is that institutions matter and that more democratic societies are more likely to raise more 
taxes overall, as well as more redistributive taxes, because democratic leaders are more responsive to 
the preferences of the poor than authoritarian regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; 
Meltzer and Richard 1981). However, Figure 1 illustrates a development that scholars are currently 
puzzling over: the rise of income inequality (e.g. Bartels 2005; Piketty 2014). While nation states have 
become more democratic over the last two centuries, they have not become more equal. This raises the 
question of whether democratic regimes are really more likely to raise more revenue and to adopt 
redistributive policies than their autocratic counterparts. 
While the positive link between democracy, government revenue and redistribution seems 
intuitive, there is in fact no analytical consensus about this. First, there is no agreement on the effect of 
regime type on tax revenue in general. While some scholars suggest a positive influence of democracy 
on tax revenue (e.g. Boix 2001), others have claimed that autocracies are more capable of revenue 
extraction (e.g. Olson 1993). Second, scholars disagree whether more democratic governments are 
more likely to adopt redistributive policies, such as the personal income and the inheritance tax. While 
democracies tend to be more responsive to the policy preferences of the (poor) median voter, 
authoritarian regimes have the incentive to redistribute as an attempt to secure their power without 
having to democratize (Mares and Queralt 2015).  
 
Figure 1: Co-development of democracy and inequality in the world since 1820 
Sources: UNU-WIDER 2015; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011. 
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In this paper, we shed light on the link between regime type and taxation based on a new global and 
historical sample of first permanent tax introductions. Particularly, we contribute to two main research 
questions. First, are democracies or autocracies more likely to adopt a new tax? And second, are 
democracies or autocracies more likely to adopt redistributive policies, particularly progressive taxes? 
While the former builds on the research that has assessed the influence of regime type on the size of 
government revenue, the second deals with the influence on redistribution. Studies that have 
investigated the link between regime type and taxation usually base their results on historical evidence 
from now advanced democracies (e.g. Aidt and Jensen 2009; Mares and Queralt 2015; Scheve and 
Stasavage 2012a) or on tax revenue as percentage of GDP (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2015; Boix 2001; 
Garcia and von Haldenwang 2015). While especially the latter is a good indicator of government size 
and also of redistributive potential, data availability tends to be restricted to a short time frame or to 
Western countries. Hence, we coded up to 92 countries worldwide to explore how the spread of tax 
legislation has varied between autocratic and democratic countries since the early 19
th
 century. 
Although tax legislation does not reveal information about how high the tax is in terms of rates or 
revenues, it is an important signal. It indicates that policymakers are willing to raise revenue through 
new means and to impose a new financial burden on certain societal groups. Specifically, we compare 
the adoption of two direct progressive taxes, the personal income and the inheritance tax, and two 
indirect regressive ones, the general sales and the value added tax, across regime types. As these taxes 
differ in terms of their redistributive nature, we can test whether regime type matters for the adoption 
of new forms of taxes overall and progressive ones in particular.   
The dataset illustrates that most countries nowadays have adopted at least three of the four 
taxes under review, yet there are critical differences in the timing of adoption (also see Figure 2). For 
instance, Britain was a forerunner, introducing the personal income tax in 1842; many western states 
soon followed suit. Nowadays most countries have adopted the personal income tax with few 
exceptions. Similarly, most states have adopted a consumption tax, such as VAT. Yet, again, the 
timing of adoption has differed widely between countries, with France being the early legislator in 
1948, whereas a number of other European countries such as Switzerland and Iceland did not adopt 
the tax until the 1990s (for an overview see Seelkopf et al. 2016). How can we explain such 
differences in tax legislation? Can variation in domestic decision-making institutions account for it? 
The paper is structured as follows: we first review the literature on regime type and taxation. 
We discuss studies that look at differences between regimes in terms of the overall amount of tax 
revenue collected and those that have investigated differences as regards the tax structure, particularly 
between direct and indirect forms of taxation. Following a description of our data and methodology, 
we provide a historical-descriptive outline of our data in section four, before we systematically analyse 
whether differences in regime type drive the proliferation of the four taxes around the world. Our 
evidence suggests that ,while democratic institutions have a positive effect on the adoption of 
progressive (direct) taxes, regime type does not matter for the adoption of taxes per se. Both kinds of 
institution – the democratic and the autocratic – have different kinds of incentives and abilities to 
introduce new taxes. 
 
2. Literature Review: Regime Type and Taxation 
Can differences in national decision-making institutions explain the likelihood of governments to 
adopt a new tax? Are democracies or autocracies more likely to introduce progressive taxes? Before 
we turn to these questions, we need to understand why political institutions should matter at all. 
Autocracies and democracies differ in the size of popular support needed to govern (Mesquita et al. 
2004, see also Genschel et al. 2016). A democracy is characterized by constitutional constraints on the 
power of the state and by popular control over it. By contrast, in an autocracy one or a few persons 
have theoretically unrestricted control over policy decisions and they do not rely on majoritarian 
support but only on the consent of a small elite group. Certainly, reality is more nuanced, depending 
on the extent of political competition allowed and the restrictions placed on universal suffrage and 
interest group formation. While we allow for a wider range of cases in our empirical analysis, we 
focus on the dichotomy to better illustrate the arguments in the literature. 
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In the following we review the literature on the effect of regime type on taxation and 
redistribution. Theoretical arguments exist along both directions, namely why democracies are more 
or less likely to maximize revenue extraction and redistribution in comparison to autocratic regimes. 
We start by, first, discussing the influence of regime type on the amount of taxes raised (the size of 
government) and, second, we consider the effect on redistributive policies. Although we discuss these 
two separately, it is worthwhile pointing out that the two are interlinked as greater revenue allows for 
higher (potentially redistributive) spending.  
 
2.1. Autocracies, Democracies, and the Size of Government 
There is no agreement on the effect of democracy on the amount of tax revenue collected (for an 
overview, see: Cheibub 1998). Despite the above mentioned institutional differences between regime 
types, their effect on the size of government is disputed. There are diverging arguments about the 
incentives and the capacities of democratic and autocratic rulers to extract revenue. In terms of 
incentives, Olson (1993) is a popular proponent of the hypotheses that an autocratic ruler is more 
inclined to maximize tax revenue than a democratic one. The dictatorial ruler will not tax all income 
and will provide some public goods so that people have higher incentives to produce and hence, more 
for the ruler to tax. Yet, because of monopolistic power the autocrat will extract more than is 
necessary and keep the extra amount as private wealth (McGuire and Olson 1996). By contrast, a 
democratic government will not take the residuum for private possession, but will allocate it to the 
citizens who can maximize their market earnings as the ruler needs to gain the majoritarian support. 
Hence, an autocrat is likely to raise more revenue in comparison to the democratic counterpart. 
Those in favor of the opposite story, namely, that democracies have the incentive to extract 
more tax revenue than autocracies, argue that democratic governments need to succumb to popular 
demands for consumption and public goods. Accordingly, democratic leaders face demands by interest 
groups such as workers and organized unions for social transfers and public goods, which increases 
the size of the public sector. In contrast, in autocracies the ruler is not pressured by the demand for 
redistributive programs and public goods and hence the size of the public sector remains smaller (de 
Schweinitz 1959; Huntington 1968; for more details see also: Cheibub 1998; Przeworski 1991). Along 
similar lines, Boix (2001) claims that following a process of economic modernization, the size of the 
public sector only grows in democratic systems. Modernization brings about structural changes and 
new social risks, which gives rise to newly emerging demands. While democratic regimes are forced 
to respond to such demands by boosting the size of the public sector, authoritarian systems can 
suppress such calls. In sum, in authoritarian systems, where a substantial part of the electorate is 
excluded from the decision-making process, the size of the public sector should remain small (Boix 
2003).  
The arguments discussed so far refer to how political regimes affect governments' incentives 
to tax. In addition, there are arguments about the influence of political regimes on governments' ability 
to collect taxes, regardless of the level of revenue they attempt to raise (see e.g. Genschel, Lierse, and 
Seelkopf 2016). In terms of ability, the effect of regime type depends on whether scholars highlight 
the role of force or the necessity of voluntary compliance. Those who emphasize the role of force 
(Haggard 1990) argue that dictatorships are more capable of enforcing (unpopular) laws than 
democracies. Because of the monopoly of power they can disregard demands from voters and interest 
groups on the design and implementation of policies. They are able to repress demands for tax 
exemptions and favors, they can pass laws that would encounter widespread opposition in a 
democratic regime and they can use coercion to enforce compliance to these laws (Fauvelle-Aymar 
1999). On the other hand, those who emphasize the necessity of societal support and voluntary 
compliance to laws, regard democracies as being more able to extract revenue (Levi 1989). In 
democracies the relationship between governments and citizens is characterized by higher levels of 
trust, as in exchange for tax payments, the government provides public goods that are positively 
valued by society. The government will act according to societal preferences or the leader will be 
voted out of office. Hence, democracies can raise more revenue as the population is more willing to 
comply with existing tax laws, where revenue is raised and spend according to the majoritarian 
interest.  
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In sum, the literature does not provide a clear cut answer about the effect of regime type on tax 
revenue. Similarly, empirical studies provide mixed evidence: While Boix (2003) and Acemoglu et al. 
(2015) find a positive effect of democracy (following modernization), Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) show that autocracies collect more revenue. Other authors attest a U-shaped relationship 
(Aidt and Jensen 2009; Garcia and von Haldenwang 2015; Plümper and Martin 2003) or no 
relationship at all between regime type and tax revenue (Cheibub 1998; Profeta, Puglisi, and 
Scabrosetti 2013). Current theoretical reasoning and empirical insights into the link between political 
institutions and their incentives and abilities to collect tax revenue has not yielded a clear-cut answer. 
 
2.2. Autocracies, Democracies, and Redistributive Taxation 
What is the state of the art with regards to the link between regime type and redistribution? Although 
the discussion is less controversial than the debate about democracy and revenue generation, there are, 
again, arguments on both sides, while the empirical evidence is also mixed. According to a number of 
authors, democracies redistribute more than autocratic regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 
and Posner 1998; Boix 2003). The main idea is that, in democracies, low-income groups participate in 
policymaking processes, and hence, it is more likely that governments opt for redistributive policies, 
which mainly benefit the poor. Similarly, Mesquita et al. (2004) argue that all leaders, whether 
democratic or not, secure support through a mix of private and public goods. Under restricted 
franchise, political leaders maintain support by providing predominantly private goods to the elites. As 
the franchise broadens, the leaders shift toward greater provision of public goods and redistribution 
increases. The classical predictions of the median voter model apply: progressive forms of taxation are 
expected to increase under a democratic regime to satisfy the needs of the (poorer than average) 
median voter (Meltzer and Richard 1981). By contrast under autocratic regimes the amount of 
redistribution is smaller, since a substantial part of the electorate is excluded from the decision-making 
process. Policy decisions are not made by the median voter but by elites who do not favor 
redistributive policies (Boix and Posner 1998: 26). 
Only a few authors have claimed that the opposite is the case: namely, autocratic governments 
provide more redistribution. One such argument is based on the regime concept by Wintrobe (1998), 
according to which the extensive provision of public goods and redistributive policies is a means to 
gain the loyalty of the population without having to democratize. Regarding redistributive taxation, 
Mares and Queralt argue that non-democratic countries with restrictive suffrage pioneered the 
adoption of personal income taxes (Mares and Queralt 2015; Mares and Queralt 2016). Their main 
argument is that the introduction of the income tax served as an additional wedge separating lower 
income voters from parliamentary representation; electoral laws often conditioned voting rights on 
direct tax payments. Hence, they claim that elites used redistributive taxation as a means to reinforce 
inequality in political participation.  
With regards to the empirical evidence on the influence of regime type on redistribution, we 
find controversial results. Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (2004) show that democracies adopt fewer 
redistributive policies, such as flatter personal income taxes. Similarly, Mares and Queralt (2015)  
show that there is an autocratic advantage in introducing the personal income tax in Europe. 
Undemocratic governments coupled with uneven wealth distribution were early adopters of 
progressive income taxes. Moreover, Aidt and Jensen (2009) find that the extension of franchise at 
first reduced the likelihood of income tax adoption across European countries, but moving more and 
more towards universal suffrage, the likelihood increased. Scheve and Stasavage (2012) on the other 
hand find no evidence that the extension of suffrage to lower classes significantly influences the 
taxation of inherited wealth in contemporary advanced capitalist democracies. In sum, the effect of 
national institutions on the size of government and on redistributive taxation is inconclusive. Not only 
can we find competing theoretical arguments but the empirical findings  are also mixed.  
Based on new data, we further examine the relationship between regime type and taxation as 
outlined above. We aim to test two sets of competing hypotheses, one on the effect of regime type on 
the 'likelihood of tax legislation' and one on the 'type of tax legislation'. As discussed above, 
democracies have some incentives to extract more resources from society and they rely on citizens’ 
loyalty, which might enable them to collect more taxes then their autocratic counterparts. Accordingly, 
Taxation and Redistribution in Autocratic and Democratic Regimes over the long-run of History 
 
European University Institute 5 
the more democratic a regime, the more likely it is to adopt a new tax as an additional source of 
revenue (H1). Yet, autocracies have the incentive to extract more revenue to maximize their private 
wealth and they have the monopoly of power to enforce (unpopular) tax laws. Hence, the competing 
hypothesis is that more autocratic regimes are more likely to adopt a new tax than democratic regimes 
(H2). 
The second set of hypotheses deals with the effect of regime type on the kind of tax 
legislation. After all, it is possible that democratically elected governments and dictators do not 
generally differ in introducing tax laws but in the kind of tax they choose. Following some authors 
(Acemoglu et al. 2015; Boix 2003), democracies are more likely to introduce redistributive policies 
than more autocratic governments (H3), while others suggest that autocratic leaders provide 
redistribution to maintain popular support without having to democratize (Wintrobe 1998). Hence, 
hypothesis 4 suggests that autocratic leaders are more likely to adopt progressive tax policies than 
democracies (H4). In the following section, we explain how we aim to contribute to the state of the art 
by expanding the temporal and geographical focus and comparing the introduction of two progressive 
and two regressive tax types. In the following section, we describe the data and the methodology used 
to test these hypotheses before we discuss our findings in section 4 and 5. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We systematically analyze the introduction of four major tax types – two direct, two indirect – in up to 
91 countries worldwide
1
 over two centuries. Before we turn to the results of our models, we first 
discuss our dependent and independent variables of interest, as well as the control variables. 
Our dependent variable is measured by a binary choice variable that is coded 0 when a country 
has not yet introduced a specific tax and 1 in the year when a country introduced the specific tax, i.e. 
the personal income, inheritance, general sales, and value added tax. The countries are considered until 
the event happens. Once a tax is introduced, the country is excluded from the analysis of the respective 
program. For each program the analysis starts a few years before the first legislation of a tax (e.g. in 
1940 for VAT, but it was first introduced in France in 1948). We collected the data relying on a wide 
number of sources such as historical texts, databases, journal articles, and dissertations. The codebook, 
as well as the data with detailed source information, is available upon request. We use the year a tax 
was permanently introduced in a country, thus ignoring previous periods of short-term tax adoption 
following previous research (Aidt and Jensen 2009). 
 
Independent Variables 
We use the polity2 measure (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011) to account for the political regime 
type. The variable ranges from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). Different to the earlier 
polity variable, polity2 treats cases of foreign interruption (-66) as missings, interregnum periods as 
neutral (0) and interpolates transition periods. In addition to the continuous polity2 measure, we also 
run a model with dummy variables to account for a possible non-linear relationship. We constructed 
three variables for full autocracies (-10 to -6), hybrid regimes or anocracies (-5 to 5) and full 
democracies (6 to 10). Furthermore, we calculated a polity-ratio, namely the degree of democracy in a 
country compared to the world average in any given year
2
. Rerunning our model with this variable 
allows us to account for the worldwide trend of democratization. We thus have a relative measure of 
democracy depending on the state of the world. 
 
Controls   
In addition to the regime type and the time trends, we also include several control variables, which are 
thought to influence tax adoption.  
                                                     
1
 The number of observations drops compared to Table 1 for two reasons. First, many of the earlier taxes were introduced 
under colonial rule. Given that we look only at independent states, these drop out of the dataset, as they already have the 
respective tax in place upon interdependence. Second, there are missing observations in the independent variables.  
2 
 To calculate meaningful averages, we added 10 to the original measure. 
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First, to measure the economic development of a country, we include the logged GDP per 
capita with a one-year lag (Gapminder 2013). Modernization fuels the demand for public goods and 
interventions. To finance these public good and services, governments introduce new taxes for 
revenue mobilization (Boix 2003). In addition, more economically advanced countries have a more 
capable bureaucracy, which is able to implement new taxes (Baunsgaard and Keen 2010). 
Second, we look at the number of wars a country experienced before the introduction date of a 
particular tax, since the costs of warfare often drive the adoption of new taxes. War is a well-known 
driver of tax innovation and redistribution, at least in European history (Kiser and Linton 2001; 
Scheve and Stasavage 2012b; Tilly 1992).  
Third, we include the number of social security programs a country has implemented (Schmitt 
et al. 2015). While wars were the major spending requirement until the Second World War, since then 
the welfare state has taken over. The variable is lagged by one year. 
Fourth, we control for the effect of regional diffusion processes. Earlier scholarship (Aidt and 
Jensen 2009; Berry and Berry 1992; Keen and Lockwood 2010) has illustrated the importance of 
spatial dependence in fiscal policy innovation. Hence, we include the number of countries that have 
introduced a tax in a particular region so far. While our diffusion variable does not fully capture the 
feedback effects, it allows us to take a large part of the spatial effect into account. 
We estimate probit equations using a maximum likelihood procedure. Given that the 
probability of introducing a specific tax is not equal at any point in time but increases over time, 
ordinary probit would be misleading and the standard errors underestimated. We follow the procedure 
suggested by (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) in order to deal with this time dependence. The authors 
show that binary time series cross section data is identical to grouped duration data. They suggest 
estimating the models, including cubic splines, as natural cubic splines capture the time dependence. 
The estimated coefficients of the cubic splines can be used to trace out the path of duration 
dependence. In comparison to time dummies, cubic splines have the advantage of providing a more 
parsimonious strategy. We included t, t
2
, and t
3
 as a cubic polynomial approximation in the estimations 
(Carter and Signorino 2010).  
Based on our new global data over two centuries, we aim to contribute to the question of 
whether institutional differences can explain the timing of tax legislation. Are democratic governments 
more likely to adopt new taxes per se or are they more likely to adopt progressive taxes than their 
autocratic counterparts? In the following section, we first provide some descriptive evidence before we 
discuss our findings in section 5. 
 
4. Tax Legislation in Democratic and Autocratic Regimes 
Despite the large body of conceptual studies and a growing body of empirical analyses, we still do not 
have convincing evidence on the influence of regime type on the size of government and on 
redistributive taxation. For the most part, existing studies base their empirical analysis on tax revenue 
as percentage of GDP (Acemoglu et al. 2015; Boix 2001; Garcia and von Haldenwang 2015), or on 
the introduction of personal income taxes in 19
th
 century Europe (Aidt and Jensen 2009; Mares and 
Queralt 2015). While this can be a good indicator for government size and even for redistribution, data 
availability tends to be restricted to either a short time frame, to one tax type or to a few, mostly 
Western countries. In this paper we draw on a new self-compiled dataset, which captures the 
introduction of four taxes in a worldwide sample of up to 92 countries from the early 19
th
 century on. 
Certainly, the introduction of a tax does not reveal the significance of the tax in terms of revenue per 
se
3
. Yet, legislation sets an important signal about the willingness of a government to collect revenue 
                                                     
3 Although most countries have adopted these taxes, there are certainly broad differences with respect to the financial amount 
contributed to overall tax revenue across the world (see e.g. Genschel and Seelkopf 2016). Yet, tax adoption is a first 
necessary step to tax revenue generation – one which also, in early adopters, started at rather low levels. For instance, in 
Britain the personal income tax contributed to about ten percent of total tax in the first decade following its introduction, 
while nowadays it contributes around 40 percent (OECD 2016; Seebohm 1983). In other words, often the tax amount 
raised significantly increases after its legal introduction. As such, the adoption of a tax sets a first signal that the 
government will use the tax as a new financial instrument. 
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through such means and is therefore a milestone in the development towards a new source of public 
finance. Moreover, the dataset covers a long time span and is global in nature and therefore does not 
discriminate between certain time periods or types of countries. In the following, we first introduce 
our data and then present the hypotheses we deduce from the literature on the role of regime type on 
the likelihood to introduce a new tax and to adopt progressive tax policies in the world. 
We draw on two sets of taxes: first, the personal income and the inheritance
4
 tax, which are 
progressive taxes. The former is a tax levied on the regular flow of income or profits of individuals, 
and the latter is raised based on the transfer of the accumulated stock of income of a deceased person. 
While they differ in their nature, they both tend to be progressive, that is they imply a heavier financial 
burden on the rich than on the poor
5
. Accordingly, the tax rate of the personal income and the 
inheritance tax usually increase as the amount of income and bequest increases. Progressive taxes are 
imposed in an attempt to reduce the financial burden of people with a lower ability-to-pay and shift the 
incidence to those with higher incomes, thereby reducing income inequality. Second, we use two sets 
of consumption taxes, both the introduction of the general sales tax and the subsequent innovation, 
VAT. While they differ in terms of the stages at which services and products are taxed, they are both 
indirect taxes, which tend to be regressive in nature. In other words, the tax burden decreases as the 
ability-to-pay increases. Although rich and poor people pay the same consumption tax rates, the poor 
tend to have a higher marginal propensity to consume and hence, pay a larger share of their income in 
such indirect taxes. 
Figure 2 illustrates the rise of the two direct taxes, the personal income tax (PIT) and the 
inheritance tax (INH), as well as the two consumption taxes, the general sales tax (GST) and the value 
added tax (VAT) around the world. It shows that at least three of the four taxes have turned into 
common revenue instruments around the world
6
. The two direct taxes originated in the 19
th
 century 
and spread during the course of the following century. Although the inheritance tax is the older tax, it 
has never become a tax instrument as common as the personal income tax. Both indirect taxes 
originated during the course of the 20
th
 century, with general sales taxes first introduced before the 
Second World War and value added taxes afterwards. All four taxes spread around the world as more 
countries were in the need of new revenue instruments. If we look at the world today (see table A1 in 
the appendix), almost all countries have adopted personal income taxes as well as general sales and 
value added taxes. Yet, the timing of adoption differed widely around the world. What determines the 
adoption of a tax as a new source of revenue? And are democracies or autocracies more likely to 
introduce redistributive forms of taxation?  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 This category involves inheritance as well as estate taxes. While estate taxes are calculated based on the net value of wealth 
owned by a deceased person, the inheritance tax is calculated based on who receives a deceased person's wealth. Yet, as 
they are both levied on the transfer of wealth after a person dies, they are grouped together in our coding scheme. 
5 Income taxes are a crucial redistributive instrument despite the argument that a proportional tax suffices, if governments 
adopt progressive social policies. However, spending programs tend to redistribute from the middle class to the poor. To 
reach the richest 5-10 percent of a society one needs high top income and wealth taxes. 
6
 Please note that the dip in the 1960s stems from the fact that many countries became independent, for which we do not have 
any information (e.g. the number of countries at risk of tax introduction increased). Especially for the older taxes and 
developing countries the data is very hard to collect and hence often missing. Hence, the relatively low number of 
introducers of PIT, INH and GST compared to VAT stems from the fact that these are older taxes and data is much 
harder to collect, not that they are more unlikely to be introduced. If we look at the number of countries that had these 
taxes in 2013 (see Table A1 in the appendix), the numbers are much more equal. Only inheritance taxes are less common; 
this does not necessarily reflect non-introduction, but rather a relatively large number of repeals in the second half of the 
20th century, also in advanced democracies. 
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Figure 2: Tax legislation in the world, 1820-2013 
Source: Own research 
 
Table 1 provides a first descriptive look at the relationship between regime type and tax legislation. 
However, it does not reveal a clear-cut picture and certainly not one as speculated in the literature 
review. According to Table 1, autocracies seem to have been most likely to introduce the two direct 
taxes as well as the general sales taxes, with only one third of the countries being democratic at the 
time of legislation. The picture for VAT is more mixed: while democratic France invented VAT and 
many fellow democracies soon followed suit, it has also been adopted by many autocratic regimes. 
This finding may, however, be driven by the fact that the two direct taxes as well as the GST were 
generally introduced during earlier periods than the spread of VAT.  
 
Table 1: Regime at Time of Tax Introduction 
 Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes 
 IHT PIT GST VAT 
Regime Type # % # % # % # % 
Democratic 8 16 15 16 19 28 38 47 
Autocratic 24 59 50 54 44 65 38 47 
Missing 17 35 27 29 4 6 5 6 
Number of Countries  49 100 92 100 67 100 81 100 
Source: own research & Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011 
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In other words, the results of Table 1 may be driven by the fact that a lot more countries were 
autocratic during the main spread of the IHT, PIT and GST in contrast to VAT. Thus, to get a more 
reliable understanding of the effect of regime type on tax legislation, we need more than simple 
bivariate analysis to account for period effects and other factors, which might influence tax 
introduction. Based on our new global data over two centuries, the following section discusses our 
findings from the statistical analysis. 
 
5. Discussion of Results 
What is the influence of regime type on tax legislation? We have estimated four different models to 
better gauge the effect of political institutions on taxation (see Table 2 and appendix). First, we include 
only the regime type with the time and spatial variables to maximize the number of observations. 
Second, we include all the afore mentioned control variables to our models. We then add two 
additional ways to measure regime type.  
 
Table 2: Probit Models for the Effects of Regime Type on Tax Introduction 
 
 Direct Taxes Indirect Taxes 
 INH PIT GST VAT 
         
Regime Type 0.05*** 0.04** 0.04*** 0.03* -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Logged GDPpc  -0.01  0.01  -0.25***  -0.24 
  (0.25)  (0.17)  (0.09)  (0.54) 
Number of Wars  -0.09  -0.03  0.03  0.04 
  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.15) 
Social Security   0.10  0.09  -0.01  1.72*** 
Programmes  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.06)  (0.58) 
Regional Adoption 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.17* 0.17** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) 
Observations 1,296 885 3,186 2,030 3,440 2,774 3,652 3,300 
Number of Countries 33 28 63 48 88 77 90 84 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Constant, Regional Dummies and Splines not reported. 
 
In model 3, we use our relative measure of regime type, namely the ratio of the polity2 variable 
compared to the yearly world average to account for the fact that the world overall has become more 
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democratic over the last two hundred years (table A2 in the appendix). Finally, we include dummy 
variables for democratic and autocratic regimes to allow for a non-linear effect in comparison to 
anocracies (see Table A3 in the appendix). 
The estimations coherently show that the effect of regime type is not universal across taxes, 
but that it varies between direct and indirect taxes. As the significant positive effect of the regime 
variable indicates, more democratic states are more likely to introduce direct taxes (inheritance and 
personal income taxes). This relationship does not, however, hold when it comes to (regressive) 
indirect taxation. Here, regime type does not seem to matter. The same findings apply, once we control 
for the other major factors that can influence the introduction of a new tax. While we lose some 
observations in model 2, the (non-)effect for regime type stays robust across all tax types. 
Democracies are more likely to introduce the two direct taxes than autocracies, but the regime type 
does not affect indirect tax introductions. We also test two other specifications of regime type. After 
all, the regime effect might be more period specific (Table A2) or less straight forward (Table A3) 
than we expect.  
As the robustness checks show, the effects remain persistent. Countries that are relativly more 
democratic than the world standard are more likely to introduce direct taxes, whereas the relative 
regime type plays no role for indirect tax adoption (Table A2). The robustness checks, however, 
suggest that the regime ratio might be the more appropriate measure for a comparison across long time 
periods: while we find no u-shaped effect of the regime type on tax introductions as some authors find 
for tax revenue (Garcia and von Haldenwang 2015), we see that countries in the middle of the regime 
spectrum are mainly driving the regime effect. This is due to the relative early introduction of direct 
taxation in many countries in the first half of the 19
th
 century, such as the inheritance tax in Greece or 
Chile or the personal income tax in Great Britain. These countries were not full democracies at the 
time, but much more democratic than their contemporary counterparts. Throughout history the more 
democratic governments in the world were the early adopters of progressive direct taxation. 
When it comes to the control variables, we do not find the same effects for all taxes. 
Interestingly, the level of economic development plays a role only for the general sales tax, and here in 
the opposite direction one would assume. Richer countries seem less likely to introduce the GST. This 
is probably driven by the prominence of VAT after the Second World War, starting in the richer 
countries of Western Europe. Yet, for most modern taxes, the level of economic development does not 
play a role. The adoption of VAT is, rather, driven by welfare state requirements and a strong process 
of diffusion. 
In sum, we do not find an effect of regime type on the likelihood of introducing a new tax 
overall. While this does not mean that institutions do not matter, it suggests that both regime types 
have abilities and incentives to raise tax revenue – although the means differ. While we cannot find an 
overall effect of regime type on tax legislation, our results indicate that more democratic states are 
more likely to introduce progressive, direct taxes. This is in line with those theories that argue that 
regimes in which the (poorer) median voter is more involved in policy decisions redistribute more 
(e.g. Mesquita, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  
 
6. Concluding remarks: regime, revenue and redistribution 
The role of democratic and autocratic regimes on the size of government and redistribution is a widely 
discussed and controversial field of research (e.g. Boix 2003; Mesquita et al. 2004; Olson 1993).There 
are a number of different theories and causal mechanisms, which suggests that either democracies or 
autocracies collect more public revenue. Because of their different institutional constraints and (non-) 
reliance on popular support, each regime type has different incentives and abilities to collect revenue. 
Although to a lesser extent, the literature also provides opposing arguments about the effect of regime 
types on redistribution. So, are democratic governments more or less likely to adopt new taxes and to 
introduce redistributive policies than their autocratic counterparts? 
Based on a new dataset, we have contributed to the research on the institutional drivers of 
revenue collection and redistribution. While existing studies generally base their evidence on a small 
sample of European states in the 19
th
 century, or on contemporary tax revenues as percentage of GDP, 
we draw on a new historical and global dataset, which captures the adoption of four taxes. The data 
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covers a long time span, 1820-2014, is global in nature and, hence, does not discriminate between 
certain time periods or types of countries. Thus, the data allows us to broaden the study of regime type 
and taxation. Moreover, we draw on two sets of taxes: first, the personal income and the inheritance 
tax, which are progressive taxes, and second, we use two sets of consumption taxes, which tend to be 
regressive in nature, that is, the tax burden decreases as the ability-to-pay increases.  
The data allowed testing competing hypotheses about the effect of regime type on the 
likelihood of tax legislation per se and on the type of taxes. Our findings show that regime type does 
not necessarily influence the likelihood of adopting taxes as such. Yet, it confirms that democracies 
are more likely to adopt direct redistributive forms of taxes than autocratic rulers. What implications 
do our findings have for the existing literature on regime type, revenue collection and redistribution? 
First, the large body of conflicting theories on the effect of regime type on revenue collection 
suggests that there are a number of reasons why both democracies and autocracies may raise more 
revenue. Rather than viewing them as opposing arguments, the mixed evidence suggests that one 
should consider them more as complementary. Both regime types have certain different abilities and 
incentives to raise revenue. This explains why we do not find a significant effect of regime type on the 
likelihood of tax legislation. It does not imply that institutions do not matter, but simply that each set 
of institutions has different enforcement mechanisms to collect revenue e.g. popular demand and 
voluntary compliance in democracies versus personal gains and coercion under autocracies.  
Second, our findings confirm the body of literature taht suggests the positive influence of 
democratic regimes on redistribution where the government attempts to satisfy the demands of the 
poor median voter as opposed to an autocratic regime where less privileged groups tend to be excluded 
from the policy decisions process (e.g. Boix and Posner 1998, Boix 2002, Mesquita). Although 
democracies do not raise more revenue than autocratic regimes, they are likely to pursue more 
redistributive policies, both on the revenue and the spending side. Hence, democracies still seem to 
carry the best way to tackle income inequality – at least within nation states.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Taxes in force around the world by regime type (2010) 
 INH PIT GST VAT 
 In Force in 2013 
Democratic 35 68 66 62 
Anocratic 8 35 34 34 
Autocratic 5 13 12 8 
Not Sovereign / Polity2 
Missing 2 4 2 3 
Total Number of Countries 50 120 114 107 
 Not in Force in 2013 
Democratic 30 0 3 7 
Anocratic 16 1 3 2 
Autocratic 8 3 4 6 
Not Sovereign / Polity2 
Missing 1 0 0 1 
Total Number of Countries 55 4 10 16 
 
Note: The three regime categories are based on standard recoding of the polity2 dataset (democracy: 6 to 10, anocracy: -5 to 
5, autocracy: -6 to -10) 
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Table A2: Regime Type and Tax Introduction III 
 INH PIT GST VAT 
     
Regime Type Ratio 0.33** 0.30* -0.05 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.10) (0.40) 
Logged GDPpc 0.08 0.04 -0.25*** -0.25 
 (0.24) (0.17) (0.09) (0.62) 
Number of Wars -0.09 -0.04 0.04 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.17) 
Social Security  0.12 0.11 -0.02 1.92*** 
Programmes 
 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.06) (0.65) 
Regional Adoption 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.19** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) 
Observations 885 2,030 2,774 3,300 
Number of Countries 28 48 77 84 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Constant, Regional Dummies and Splines not reported. 
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Table A3: Regime Type and Tax Introduction with Dummies 
 INH PIT GST VAT 
     
Democracy Dummy 0.59 0.39 -0.12 0.17 
 (0.38) (0.24) (0.18) (0.52) 
Anocracy Dummy 0.77*** 0.56*** -0.30 -0.26 
 (0.26) (0.19) (0.19) (0.49) 
Logged GDPpc 0.25 0.08 -0.24** -0.25 
 (0.28) (0.15) (0.09) (0.52) 
Number of Wars -0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.14) 
Social Security  0.11 0.04 -0.02 1.59*** 
Programmes 
 
(0.14) (0.09) (0.06) (0.57) 
Regional Adoption 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.16* 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) 
Observations 885 2,030 2,774 3,300 
Number of Countries 28 48 77 84 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Constant, Regional Dummies and Splines not reported. 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                     
 
